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MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
SUBJECT: Advise Coursesof Action
1. Purpose: The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the President and his administration
on the flawed logic used to devise the strategy in Vietnam. It is my intention to give due
notice to the President of the new nature of the conflict in Vietnam and the motivations that
drive the South Vietnamese regime. As the chief of staff for the United States Army Pacific
Command I feel that it is my duty and obligation to challenge the status quo and suggest a
fresh COA (course of action).
2. Current Strategy: The current strategy in Vietnam is driven by strategy already established
by previous administrations, but in all reality this is just a cloak over the non-existence of a
strategy. George Kennan in 1947 stated that the United States should take a "policy of firm
containment, designed to confront Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point.. ."i
This policy has been the status quo for foreign strategy in the United States since Truman
announced the Truman Doctrine. As too many presidents have done in the past, decisions
are being made without consulting advisors, just as President Truman created the Truman
Doctrine.ii While we are fighting the Vietnamese we still claim that this is an intervention
from Russian and Chinese aggression, although most milITaryanalyst woulOargue their -~
involvement in this conflict is extremely limited, if not non-existent. In a speech the




because "we have a promise to keep," and that "since 1954 every American President has
offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam."jjj
3. President Eisenhower, Vietnam and the Sunk Cost: Every American business has come
across the problem of "sunk costs" at some point in their lifetime. Managers and employees
alike seek to keep a project alive that money, time and emotions have been invested in, that
in all reality have no business of staying alive. So, because of the costs of the past people
keep feeding the problem project with the notion that if they do not then all the costs already
created will be in vain. The United States Armed Forces are responsible for this mistake as
well on many occasions. It probably would even be fair to say that the government has been
caught in this illogical reasoning. The investments made by Eisenhower in the mid to late
fifties are now the only reasons why we are in Vietnam still today. President Eisenhower
himself displayed his disgust with Indochina to the NSC by stating "how bitterly opposed I
am to [putting ground forces anywhere in Southeast Asia]," claiming that, "this war in
Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions!"iv Although President Eisenhower was
disgusted with the thought of sending troops into Indochina, especially just after a peace was
signed in Korea, he finally caved in to pressures from France, the Senate, and his own
advisors to take the COA he despised. Eisenhower claimed that if no action was taken then
"the broader considerations" of the "falling domino principle" could over take all of
Southeast Asiav and even worse in the future "the loss of Southeast Asia would be followed
by the probable loss of Japan, Formosa, and-the Philippines, which would then tmeaten
Australia andNew Zealand."vi At the time this claim could have been conceivably true, but




rather than externally controlledby the major powers of the world. The costs that we have
paid in the past should not extend the war to a major American conflict. The consideration of
,.'
increasing the amount of troops in Vietnam to over 400,000 by the President should not be
persuaded by a "promise" made by past Presidents. Instead the increase should be decisively
made because of a need of more man power to fulfill the current mission.
4. Emergence of Autonomy: Prior to the beginning of this decade independent nations have
been fairly influenced by both Soviet and American intervention alike. Now we face a world
with a new sort of autonomy that is being found more and more in these nations.vii The
demise of European colonialism has brought about third world autonomy that has been
present more in latter years. The roots of this sort of international policy derive from
Yugoslavia's Tito. Tito can be identified as a Communist, but by no means was he a
Stalinist. By "non-alignment" Tito was able to play the Soviet Union and the United States
against each other to achieve what he wanted by giving the prospect of tilting the balance of
power.viiiThis policy of "non-alignment" went well beyond Eastern Europe, and as
European colonialism in Asia declined the policy was adopted by the rising nationalistic
countries. Therefore, any threat made by the South Vietnamese of falling to communism
should not be considered when making the decision on troop and resource commitments.
China only reluctantly plays a role in the Vietnam conflict because of the very same threats
made by-theNorth-Vietnamese-that if they do-not-give-supportthen they will fall to
capitalism. Ifwe do not help the South Vietnamese it is like}Ythecommunists will take
over, but they would not be aligned with China or the Soviet Union; which in Yugoslavia's
case would not be terrible.
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5. Strategic Points: It is justly shown that the flawed thought of sunk costs and the new
emergence of autonomy identify Vietnam as an insignificant point in the large grand scheme
ofCommu.nist-American conflict. While we claim that the strategy in Vietnam is to contain
communism, the Vietnamese claim that the strategy in Vietnam is to achieve independence
(from either Northern or Southern perspective). Communist or not, Vietnam will remain
independent from either US or Soviet/PRC camp. In essence this conflict transcends
ideology and is only about nationalism.
6. Courses of Action: Currently the United States has a few COA to consider for the Vietnam
conflict:
A. Continue advising role - Under this COA the United States would maintain its
current troop numbers and keep an advising role in South Vietnam. This would call
for commanders on the ground to train up South Vietnamese counterparts to do jobs
that Americans would do if the troop numbers and involvement were increased.
Minimal amounts of direct conflict will be conducted by Specials Operations and
CIA.
B. Expand conflict using General Westmoreland's guidance - General
Westmoreland requested in 1965 for a troop increase to bring our involvement to at
least 600,000 troops on the ground. Expanding the conflict to decisively engage
~'=North Vietnamese Army (NYAlPR.VNAnny) with~l'lus-up oftroo~in the_. '"'""' ~"""
provinces of North Vietnam would be a bloody fight. Infrastructure, main supply




For commanders on the ground I would recommend that the Vietnam Primer by Lt.
Col. David H. Hackworthbe read to fight against insurgent Vietcong (VC) forces.
, \
Vietnam Primer was written in the summer of 1965'andis a compilation of tips,
tactics, and techniques that will assist battalion commanders down to platoon leaders
conduct operations. The compilation was developed out of thousands of unit after
action reports (AARs) and is highly modeled off ofVC and NYA operations. Lt. Col.
Hackworth wrote that in order to win in Vietnam the key to victory is conducting
operations that bring the fight to the VC and NYA. With a plus-up of troops to bring
the number of operating soldiers to 600,000 the fight would certainly be brought to
the NYA's door step.
C. Realign strategy in Vietnam - Most analysis can generally agree that the conflict in
South Vietnam is being fought for the purpose of checking Communist aggression.
While this driving factor has been the predominant school of thought in the United
States it is one that is flawed, as discussed above. Nationalism clearly is Ho Chi
Minh's motivation, and it is clear to me that his intent is to create a unified Vietnam
by means of Communist ideology. In order to combat that the United States must
turn the fight from a fight against Communism to a fight supporting nationalism. The
end state of this will be an independent, stable South Vietnam that would be capable
of operating military forces in North Vietnam. I consider this course of action the
best of the three because it has a~elanof redeploym~nt!.hat is lacking from the other
two. Nation building should be the by-word in the United States Army and
commanders on the ground would have to change operations to include the following:
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i. Infrastructure Development by Army Corps of Engineers to include
agricultural, power, sewage, educational institutions and economic.
ii. Government Building
iii. Security Operations
1. Phase 1 - Security operations conducted by United States forces
2. Phase 2- Training of South Vietnamese military and police forces
3. Phase 3- South Vietnamese forces shadow American forces
4. Phase 4- Hand off of security operations with American escort
forces
5. Phase 5- Total responsibility of security operations to the South
Vietnamese
iv. Humanitarian projects by American forces and NGOs
7. Conclusion: The Vietnam cQnflicthas been driven by Qldstate PQlicythat needs to.be
refQnnulated to.align with NQrthVietnam PQlicy/strategy. Creating a strategy QfnatiQn
building, rather than direct military cQnflict,WQuldcQmbatthe insurgent style Qffighting that
HQChi Minh currently maintains. The SQuthVietnamese peQpleneed to.feel that the United
States is there to.help them and this can nQtbe dQnewith military might. Only with a finely










i "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" first published in 1947 by ForeignAffairs authored by George Kennan
iI Eisenhower:SoldierandPresidentbyStephenE.Ambrose,Page223
iii April 7, 1965 President Johnson's "Peace Without Conquest" speech given at John Hopkins University.
Referenced from the LBJ Library and Museum.
iv NSC notes taken down from a stenographer on January 8th,1954 .
v April 7thnew conference Eisenhower's famous declaration on Indochina from the Eisenhower Library
vi Eisenhower:SoldierandPresidentbyStephenE.Ambrose,Page361
vii The Cold War: A New History by John Lewis Gaddis. This is the thesis that John Lewis Gaddis
portrays in Chapter Four of this book. It charges that while the superpowers thought they had enormous
amount of control and influence over independent small nations, in reality they had little to none. In fact,
most of the time these small nations persuaded the super powers by given threat of falling to the others
camp.
viii TheColdWar:A NewHistorybyJohnLewisGaddisPage124
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